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Case Studies  The Berlin Case Study: The Socially Integrative City.Wrangelkiez, Boxhagener Platz, Ostkreuz

2.2. URBAN II as Partnership at Programme Level with Structured Procedures

URBAN II is a Community Initiative of the European Union. The aim of this programme is the “economic and social regeneration of cities and of neighbourhoods in crisis in order to promote sustainable urban development” (see CEC 2000, 1). Furthermore, it is targeted at initiating organisational change (ibid).

In this case study we understand the Urban II programme in Berlin as a partnership. We will discuss structural questions of programme governance using this case as an example . This will be done in four steps. All of them are based on the traditional logic of programme development and implementation:

  1. From needs to funding: programming

  2. From funding to projects: structure of cooperation

  3. From projects to action: project realization

  4. From action to effects: monitoring and evaluation

From Needs to Funding: Programming

Since the early 1990s parts of the area have been involved in funding programmes of the state of Berlin: the area to the South of Frankfurter Allee participated in the programme “upgrading the environment of large housing estates”, the Kaskelkiez and Weitlingstraße area had been designated as renewal areas (for more on the German renewal mechanisms see the Hamburg case study). Problems occurred not only through the limited amount of funding, but also because the outline of the targeted areas left problems in the spaces in-between where no public funding had been made available and further social and physical decline was expected in case of further lack of investment.

In this situation, the Community Initiative URBAN II offered the possibility to react with a pre-emptive strategy for the whole area. As the area wasn’t to be funded by the federal-state-programme “Socially Integrative City” but showed similar problematic development tendencies (see 2.1.) - and at the same time the districts showed interest to collaborate - the Berlin Senate Department of Urban Development decided to apply with this area for EU funding.

Being a part of ERDF, there are clear rules for the programme: on one hand, there are the obligatory regulations for the EU structural funds (for example Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999), on the other hand there are the specific guidelines for the Community Initiative URBAN, in which the commission laid down general aims, criteria for the eligible areas and priorities of action (C(2000)1100, 28.04.2000).

The most relevant of these are:

  • The implementation phase is limited until 2006,

  • There is a fixed budget (here: 14.87 Mio € ERDF + national co-funding, so in sum it is 19.842 Mio €),

  • The local authority has to develop its strategy out of 7 priorities of action; housing is excluded from funding,

  • The local authority has to prepare certain documents and must follow complex administrative procedures for the implementation. For instance, money can’t be changed from one priority to another on short notice: this can only be done after midterm and only with the approval of the European Commission.

After this elementary decision, an intense process of programming started in spring 2000. According to the regulations for the structural funds, a programme document (Community Initiative Programme CIP) had to be written as a first step. Together with a SWOT-analysis of the city and the area, this document has to present the strategy with the main aims for development, the coherence with other strategies of the EU, an outline of the proposed administrative structure and an apportionment of the money to the priorities of action. For the Ostkreuz area, the following thematic priorities were chosen:

  • Economic development and job creation (23%),
  • Public space and ecology (24%),
  • Cultural and social issues (46%);

7% of the budget are spent on technical support.

During this process there were various discussions with stakeholders from the area. Due to these events, expectations were raised (especially from residents) which were too high and cannot be satisfied with the given budget and timeframe. As vision for the area, the programme document presents a strengthening of the competitiveness of inner city areas based on the specific qualities of compact urban structures with mixed uses. So far, there is no closer specification of this vision.

A further difficulty was that for a long time it was not clear if funding was granted at all. A first step was the Commission accepting the bid in autumn 2000. But there was still one more year to go until the official starting signal could be given.

However, with this date, the programming phase was still not finished. Following the allowance, a programme complement had to be written, in which the priorities had to be explicated in measures with which they should be targeted, a set of indicators had to be developed, and administrative rules for the implementation had to be laid down. These were handed in in March 2002 and were taken note of by the Commission in April 2002.

The proceeding of the programme is monitored frequently with annual implementation reports and discussions in the Monitoring Committee. The funds can be granted until 2006, in the following two years granted projects can still be finished, but new projects can’t be started after 2006.

Assessment

With the regulations given by the EU, the process is structured similarly to the IAPs in Dublin or the Kvarterloft-programme in Copenhagen. But particularly in comparison to the latter there are important disadvantages here:

The process of programming is very intense and takes a lot of time. Because the confirmation of funding is only given after sending in the proposal, a broad participation of stakeholders in the early phase of developing the programme is hardly possible. When the programme then officially starts, the necessary fixings lead to frustration and the feeling that citizens cannot participate in decision-making. So, with Community Initiatives in particular, the grade of detailing in the programme documents is too high. The expectation is that projects can be named very early. But this does not take into account that conditions can already have changed by the time the money is made available.

Being tied to certain priorities leads to a balanced choice of projects and a precise targeting of the areas in which only few proposals are made. But at the same time the early fixing of sums and indicators in the documents needs project indications.

A limitation in content is given only through the exclusion of investment in housing; but a stabilisation of the housing market is reached through improvements in the living environment. This policy approach is in line with the ideas of the Senate of the state of Berlin (“public money for public space”). This is in sharp contrast to the project in Copenhagen, where housing is the main emphasis of funding. It could be worth considering if a limited budget for modernisation measures could be a sensitive supplement to the programme approach, since it would give further incentives for private investment in the area.

There is no budget for the final phase which could support anchoring-activities. Only projects which have been granted earlier can be finished. So this phase has – again in contrast to Kvarterloft – a strictly administrative character.

From funding to projects: structure of cooperation

The cooperation of stakeholders is organised through four institutions:

  • The Monitoring Committee controls and monitors how the programme is carried out,
  • The Steering Board decides about projects and elementary questions of the process
  • The Working Groups (one for each thematic priority) prepare the decisions about projects as regards content, and they accompany the project realisation
  • The Coordination Group facilitates the “fine tuning” amongst the coordinators of the authorities involved and the external management.

Amongst these institutions, the Steering Board is the most important one to tie together the stakeholders. The following stakeholders are members:

  • Senate administrations for Economic Development, Employment, Education, Urban Development
  • The two local authorities (districts) involved
  • Community representatives from the 4 neighbourhoods
  • Economic and social partners, such as the chamber of commerce, Federal Employment Agency, local businessmen, delivery agencies
  • Representatives of local initiatives: cultural and ecological associations.

Some of these stakeholders also participate in the working teams.

Roles of the main players

Carrying out the programme is managed by a team. Each institution involved has a specific function and only good teamwork will lead to success. The Senate Department of Economy, Labour and Women is the managing authority. It is the main contact for national government and EU, it decides about the legibility of expenses and controls the administrative procedures of the programme.

The Senate Department of Urban Development is responsible for carrying out the programme. It is the motor of the process and insures that all necessary contents are covered. Its area of responsibility is the running of the programme (giving grants, reporting duties). As “advocate of the programme” it mediates between the two districts if necessary and communicates with other Senate Departments. It is supported by an external management: this agency is the contact point for all stakeholders – in particular for the community – and tries to mediate as a neutral actor between the players.

The two districts are the main local (governmental) stakeholders. Their responsibility covers not only the financing of enduring public services but also competencies with regard to planning- and building regulations, which are highly relevant for the projects. Here, the various sectoral policies of the Senate Departments have to be transformed into the provision of local services. So, they are the most important stakeholders for project implementation: Projects for improvements of public space or related to traffic are often managed by the districts, and for the other projects, the responsible institutions have to cooperate with them.

Demands for Cooperation

Cooperation amongst stakeholders is necessary and not only by free will, but mandatory in many respects, if project realisation is meant to work. Collaboration can be necessary – depending on the project – with regard to contents (combine with or separate from services already delivered), securing financing after funding ends or for co-financing.

The last points are important as the national funds are not bundled in one budget (as it is the case in Copenhagen).  So the job here is to find co-funding for each single project. Only few projects can be co-funded by the department responsible for Urban II, most of the times funds from third parties are needed (like employment funds or youth services).

In the case of the biggest project, the restoration of a school hall (Taut Hall), the participation of a number of further departments is necessary: the department for building is responsible for bringing in the national co-funding and for carrying out the construction works. The Department of Education is the owner of the building and responsible for running it when it is finished. It is interested in using parts of it later on. The district has to secure most of the uses and ties them with other local services. The Urban II programme coordination writes a use concept which brings public and private uses together. All in all, more than 10 administrative departments are involved. The core group alone consists of five members.

In the case of the neighbourhood centre „Kiezspinne“, funding is secured by the Department responsible for Urban II („Socially Integrative City“). However, in this project the cooperation of the local authority is necessary because some of the services can only be realised with funding at district level and also the construction- and planning competencies are with the districts. The main problem is to make the property available. The district department responsible argued that the rent price had to be measured according to regional market prices. The rent and the extremely high running costs made a bankruptcy of the neighbourhood association seem quite likely after the end of EU funding. In the end, it was decided that the building is not going to be re-used, but a smaller new building is going to be built instead. Although an agreement seems more likely now, the core problem remains: an interpretation of regulations based on abstract economic conceptions – in combination with the funding conditions – means that projects of private initiatives can simply not be carried out on public property. To make a long story short, uneconomic decisions are taken which undermine the ideas of the regulations. It remains unclear, if the regulations themselves or their narrow-minded application are the main cause for these results.

Choosing the Projects

In January 2002, the Steering Board decided about a set of criteria which had been developed by the coordination group and which is since then used to check project proposals. Besides eligibility for funding, economic aspects and an overall assessment, it includes the following elements:

  • Reduction of structural deficits (barriers) in the area
  • participation (in developing the concepts, realisation and use)
  • effects on the local employment situation (improve competitiveness of small and medium-size enterprises, target first labour market)
  • ecological improvements (resources savings)
  • improving living environment (urban image, preservation of historic buildings)
  • equal opportunities (gender mainstreaming)
  • innovative aspects (added value)
  • sustainability

A more detailed specification according to each field of action was not made: firstly in order to support the cross-sectoral approach of the programme, secondly, because a too specific matrix would have caused methodological problems and decreased the transparency of decision-making.

The real discussion of the contents of projects should happen in the working teams. But this doesn’t always work: In some projects problems which could have been solved earlier are only seen after approval by the Steering Board. This lack of efficiency of the working teams may have its origin in the following factors:

  • Some members are not authorised to make decisions in the name of their organisation, so the promises given in the working teams are not binding.
  • Because of the broad range of projects, an ideal composition of the teams with regard to expert knowledge is only rarely given and systematically hard to achieve: In order to secure a comparability of the assessment of projects, a low fluctuation of members should be reached. But this prevents the inclusion of experts for projects, because with such a high number of participants the meetings couldn’t be managed anymore. For instance, in the Taut-School-hall-project the Department of Education is taking part, but neither the contact persons of the districts nor the departments for construction or cultural affairs. It has been tried to compensate this through collecting statements for each project from the co-funding departments (as the experts on the subject) and the responsible department of the district.
  • In addition, the motivation of the participants to support the projects after approval is significantly lower. Here, it would be worth looking at the experience of Copenhagen, where a similar situation had led to a re-organisation of the process.

Because of the number of members and decisions at the Steering Board, which makes the final decisions about projects, there is hardly a possibility to look at individual projects in more detail. However, the inclusion of so many members and the search for consensus leads to a basic support for all projects. In many cases cooperative working has to be trained in concrete projects, before it shows effects. The contacts which have developed through the Steering Board led to a “high wire” amongst the members - this eases pragmatic solutions to occurring problems. This is an advantage compared to the neighbourhood management model (see below), where this integration is not possible because the areas are much smaller, and so the Senate Department has to take over this part on a city-wide basis.

Assessment

The chosen funding model of co-funding at project level is ambivalent: On one side, it helps to integrate the sectoral administrations into the process and to tie the projects to regular services (national, regional and local). This level of identification would be harder to reach with a 100 % funding model. But at the same time this construction makes some projects even more difficult (up to withdrawal) and causes additional costs in their administering – from the need for contractual insurance to reporting duties. It cannot be said yet if this can be improved by getting used to these procedures.

It remains open if solutions can be found which combine a high level of identification from the administrations with less resources.

The inclusion of all participants in the Steering Board and the open offer to collaboration in the working teams form a solid basis for sharpening the perception of the area and project-based opportunities for cooperation. It is positively influenced by the relatively high budget, the size of the area and the chance to take part in funding decisions. The distribution of tasks amongst the administrations for economic development, urban development and the districts is sensitive and efficient. In addition, the participation of two districts supports mutual learning processes and an exchange about good practice.

A need for changes occurs at the level of the working teams: for one, only few members manage to act as communicators between the programme and their administrations; there still is a lack of communication into the “home” administration and a lack of “ownership” – the members do not take an active role in accompanying the projects.

In the next phase (project realisation), coordination and monitoring are necessary as well as the implementation of project-based working groups. It would be worth trying to make use of the experience of Copenhagen for designing an efficient governance structure for this phase.

From Projects to Action: Project Realisation

After the agreement of the Steering Board not all problems are solved. Without all administrations cooperating, a realisation of the projects within the tight timeframe and given targets is difficult to manage.

The idea to enlarge a general practitioner’s office for homeless people failed because the standards for the equipment of the new part – which are laid down in the regulations for support of the homeless –couldn’t be met. Apart from concerns about the project raised by the responsible administrations, financing couldn’t be secured for the time after funding. So the project had to be modified to a more social-work oriented approach.

In the case of the project „Rudi’s Nachbarschaftszentrum“, the regulations on heritage conservation and building control could not be harmonised for the conversion of an empty historical building. The building supervision demanded a second rescue path because of the public use, and the construction of a lift to make it accessible for handicapped people. In order not to reduce the already limited space, this was to be put at the outside. The authority for heritage preservation did not agree with this. After a mediating intervention of the external programme management, a solution was found which leads to a limitation of use possibilities but does not question the project as a whole. This example demonstrates how difficult it is to meet different legal requirements on one building in the case of public use. With regard to the conversion of existing buildings, this sometimes leads to a failure of projects. An improvement of this situation can only be expected if legal regulations take these difficulties and the pressing financial situation into account.

A further difficulty lies within the regulations concerning the budget: pragmatic solutions fail not so often because of legal regulations but due to their narrow-minded and un-sensitive application by some members of staff. For URBAN II, a specific model was designed, which provides the institutions implementing the project with 100% after they have given their co-funding part. This procedure is used in other situations as well. But some of the co-funding departments have general objections against signing such a contract: in fear that this procedure could limit their own scope of action.

The process of implementing the projects shows that a realisation is often only possible in a collaborative effort of various administrations. Some things can only be brought forward from within an administration and interventions from the outside would cause a blockade. In other cases, the own members of staff cannot reach any progress, here interventions, e.g. from the Senate, the URBAN office or residents’ representatives, are more promising as they do not have to stick to hierarchies and can go straight to the responsible person.

In order to speed up the implementation, more project-based working groups are formed, consisting of directly affected and interested people. However, often not all relevant departments can be included.

Residents’ Participation

The participation of local residents is a core requirement set by the European Commission. This point was taken on offensively from early days because of the manifold experience in this respect of the administration carrying out the programme. Residents are involved at many levels: at programme level through membership in the boards and a survey; at project level for instance in an art competition: the first idea here was developed by residents, some representatives were part of the jury and there were additional public meetings open to all citizens.

At first, the administrations involved were reluctant in accepting this participatory approach, partly due to their own insecurity in this new field. Throughout the process, however, a process of learning and acceptance began which will hopefully be fertile for carrying out projects in the future.

Assessment

Despite all problems in detail: the core problem is a lack of project competence of the participating members of administrations. On one hand this relates to knowledge of the field: In order to carry out integrated projects a variety of institutions has to be included. No one is able to cover the width of needed knowledge. Related to this is a lack of competence to decide. Because of fragmented responsibilities, all see only parts of the situation, and no one is responsible for the whole project. Limited timeframes and other complexities can hardly be managed. It was tried to solve this problem through appointing  persons responsible for a project, but this proposal was met with high resistance. But even where motivated people take on such tasks they sometimes fail because they do not have the sufficient competencies and are finally dependent on the goodwill of others. The many legal requirements make things even more difficult: Although each might make sense by itself, in multi-dimensional projects they tend to mount up so that projects can’t be carried out within the time and budget constraints.

Here, issues parallel to Dublin can be seen – it would be worth investigating whether the Dublin model of a socio-spatial administrative organisation has managed to solve this problem.

The approach to residents’ participation is successful and could be developed further. But it can’t be prevented that only few and anyway open-minded residents can be reached with the existing instruments.

From Action to Effects: Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring

Monitoring is implemented with regard to the whole programme and to single projects and works via formal and informal instruments. The formal instruments result from the regulations of the structural funds; informal instruments support the decision-making process of the stakeholders and the committees implementing the programme.

At programme level, the formal instruments are the annual implementation report, which gives information regarding the development of the area and the progress of the programme as regards financing and content; the monthly reports for the financial monitoring of the managing authority. Informal instruments are various lists (milestones, confirmation of financial flows, agenda for action). Even though monitoring is happening in all committees, at programme level it is mainly the task of the Monitoring Committee, where the participating administrations and economic and social partners are meeting. As these institutions are also members of the Steering Board, where reporting takes place about the progress of the programme, here the information is mainly aimed at the representatives of federal and EU government.

Mandatory reports at project level are the final report and – for longer projects – annual reports. Informal instruments here are the status reports which have to be presented by the institutions responsible for a project to the steering Board. Occurring problems are dealt with at the reporting about the progress of a project, although their quality needs further improvement. In addition, the working teams are informed about the status of the projects frequently, here the responsible stakeholders are invited from time to time as well.

The monitoring is based on indicators. The European Commission requires context indicators measuring the development of the area, and main indicators, which should present the impact of the programme. At the beginning of the programme, targets were fixed for each priority. For the projects, indicators are agreed upon in the grant letter. However, in the end these indications help to fulfil the requirements of the EU but do not have a real steering function, because it is quite doubtful that they mirror the reality to a sufficient extent.

For the context indicators, the reason is that they are only available at district level, which isn’t representative for the URBAN II area. For instance, data for Kreuzberg and Hohenschönhausen differ significantly in terms of the rate of migrants. A middle range here holds no information. Even if more precise data was available, the problem remains that success or failure of the programme cannot be isolated from the overall development of the area. The impact of the programme cannot be measured on this basis.

For the main indicators, the situation is not much better. They are based on projects, but for integrated projects they measure isolated impacts and not the synergy effects. So, for instance the art competition is presented by the number of upgraded spaces and the number of events. All the communicative processes in the neighbourhood and between residents and artists are not looked at, because they could only be described qualitatively.

Evaluation

The structural funds regulations require an ex ante evaluation and a midterm evaluation. Whilst the first one just aims at commenting on the chosen approach, the latter faces the problem that the programme has only started by the time of evaluation (spring 2003). An assessment from outside can surely help to look at the structure of service delivery and efficiency of individual projects; but a quantitatively based analysis has to fall short in assessing the programme.

In the evaluation, a focus group discussion was undertaken with a broad group of stakeholders. This gave a good insight into the current status and problems of programme implementation. It has to be considered if such an instrument could be used for a regular monitoring in the future.

Assessment

There is no doubt about the need for a regular evaluation of the programme. But at the moment this takes a lot of resources with little effect: In particular the degree of reference of quantitative analyses is low. Because of the long starting phase, the midterm assessment also comes too early; but at a later point in time a redirection of the programme would not be possible anymore. And ex post evaluations are only finished when the follow up has already started, so they do not have an influence on its design either. The midterm assessment should therefore concentrate on the structures of the programme implementation; these are already trained after two years and would certainly see much less attention without this push from the outside.

More important than extensive evaluations would be an efficient monitoring system for programme and area development. A regular focus group discussion could be considered for this purpose. With this, results could be produced quite quickly, which can influence the further progress. The relevance of the indicators could be increased by putting them in context, but their number should definitely be limited. With regard to monitoring of the projects a similar procedure could be developed.

A regular discussion about the programme with the EU Commission and the national government is helpful. But the current structure of the Monitoring Committee seems not efficient, since – because of the little size of the programme - many stakeholders sit on the Steering Board as well. A better idea would probably be that the programme coordinators would meet with these institutions twice a year and discuss the current state of the implementation.

2. The Policy of Neighbourhood Development in Berlin: "Socially Inclusive Urban Development"
2.1 Elements of "Socially Inclusive Urban Development"     2.3 The Neighbourhood Management Approach: An Integrated Operational Approach for Decentralised Procedures at a Local Level

 

ENTRUST is a research project supported by the European Commission under the Fifth Framework RTD Programme and contributing to the implementation of the
Key Action 4; “City of Tomorrow and Cultural Heritage" within the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development thematic programme
Contract n°: EVK4-CT-2001-20007